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Launched on 2 November 2003, Philosophy for Business is an e-journal published by the International Society for Philosophers, looking at philosophical and ethical aspects of business practice.

We are aiming for a wide circulation to companies and corporations around the world, as well as academic philosophers.

In order to gain the widest possible readership, articles should be written in simple, non-technical language. The target length is 2500 words.

Some themes that we will be looking at:

   Globalization and monopoly
   Is business ethics possible?
   Philosophy of economics
   Practical ethics
   Idea of a code of conduct
   Freedom of speech
   Industrial democracy
   Whistle blowing
   Ecology and sustainability
   Education and health
   Business and the law
   Tax avoidance and evasion



Please send articles for Philosophy for Business to one of the Editors (see below) or to the List Manager Geoffrey Klempner at klempner@fastmail.net.

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The views expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect those of the Editors or List Manager. If you have any suggestions, comments or criticisms, or if you would like to be an Editor, please write to the List Manager at klempner@fastmail.net.

Philosophy for Business is an open access journal, as defined by the Budapest Open Access Initiative.

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LIST MANAGER

Geoffrey Klempner

klempner@fastmail.net




EDITORS

Marco Senatore
marco.senatore@tesoro.it

Peter S Borkowski
p.borkowski@aui.ma

Dena Hurst
dena.hurst@appa.edu

Sean Jasso
sean.jasso@pepperdine.edu





International Society for Philosophers
[back to archive]

P H I L O S O P H Y   F O R   B U S I N E S S           ISSN 2043-0736
http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/

Issue number 57
24th February 2010

CONTENTS

I. 'Why Punishment Fails or Succeeds: Existential reflections from one being 
punished' by Neil Abramson

II. 'Answer on the Ethics of Monetary Interest' by Geoffrey Klempner

III. Call for Papers: African Philosophy of Management

-=-

EDITOR'S NOTE

Last year, Neil Abramson, associate professor at Simon Fraser University, Segal
Graduate School of Business failed to gain the promotion to full professorship 
he'd hoped for. Rather than retire to lick his wounds, he used the experience 
as an occasion for original philosophical inquiry, which was published in 
Philosophy for Business Issue 51. Over the year, Neil has had time to reflect 
further on his experience and his reaction to it. The result is an insightful 
existential analysis of the pitfalls of punishment as a means to improve 
behaviour in organizations.

A couple of weeks back I received an unsigned email asking, 'What do you think 
of the role of interest, as in monetary interest?' I replied with my standard 
response when I receive odd questions out of the blue: 'Please submit this to 
Ask a Philosopher. Try to elaborate on your question a little, if you can.' The
question duly came, suitably elaborated. My reply, which appeared in my 
Tentative Answers blog, is instructive, so I have included the question and 
answer here.

What are your views on African philosophy of management? The question is 
pertinent because we all-too readily assume that business is business, whether 
you are trading with Nigeria or Great Britain or Peru. But is it? Much has been
written on African philosophy and its contrast with philosophy in the Western 
tradition. Yet as David W. Lutz and Peter John Opio report, business ethics and
management theory taught in African countries still relies predominantly on 
Western philosophical assumptions. They are calling for contributions on this 
topic for a special issue of Philosophy of Management. Full details below.

Geoffrey Klempner

-=-

I. 'WHY PUNISHMENT FAILS OR SUCCEEDS: EXISTENTIAL REFLECTIONS FROM ONE BEING 
PUNISHED' BY NEIL ABRAMSON

The goal of organizational punishment is to modify a subordinate's undesirable 
behaviors in more organizationally acceptable directions (Butterfield et al., 
1996). Punishment is defined as an aversive consequence that exists in a 
contingency relationship with some defined behavioral response deemed 
undesirable (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). Scheler (1973) argued that the purpose 
of punishment was not simply the short-term elimination of wrong doing but also
rehabilitation of the wrong doer as an effective organizational member. This 
occurred when the wrong doer voluntarily repented his/ her past mistakes and 
was forgiven (Abramson & Senyshyn, 2009).

While managers generally believe that punishment is necessary when undesirable 
actions negatively affect organizational performance (Podsakoff, 1982), it is 
not clear that punishment is effective. Studies have reported positive and 
negative results (Ball et al., 1994). A meta-analysis of 21 studies was unable 
to establish that punishment was effective either in reducing undesirable 
behaviors or satisfying the victims of wrong doers (Williams, 1998). Sims (1980)
seemed justified arguing that supervisors should avoid punishing subordinates
because punishment was not likely to influence employees in positive directions.

Scheler (1973) argued that conventional punishment based on retributive justice
generally failed because it created fear (Scheler, 2010) and resistance (Scheler,
1973) in the wrong doer. While punished persons seemed to comply, they could 
also retaliate, negating any positive effects (Janssen and Bushman, 2008). 
Punished persons who felt unfairly treated developed negative attitudes 
including resentment and hostility (Butterfield et al., 1996). They engaged in 
'anticitizenship' behaviors including avoidance of work, defiance, resistance 
to authority, aggression, sabotage, and/ or revenge (Ball et al., 1994).

Last year I was punished. I was denied promotion to full professor because my 
faculty's tenure and promotion committee, and my Dean, judged my research 
results inadequate. My punishment was to remain an associate professor for at 
least two more years while watching younger associates, often with fewer 
publications, receive the coveted promotion and the higher salaries. If you had
asked me whether I thought punishment was effective before I was punished, I 
would have agreed with Shinada and Yamagishi (2007) that punishment would make 
a rational person cooperate, and that anticitizenship was irrational. Now I 
understand why punished persons engage in anticitizenship. I felt angry and 
mistreated, yet I also felt despair that perhaps I had misjudged the quality of
my work. I tried to cooperate and be a good citizen, but then I would find 
myself covertly behaving in uncooperative ways in stressful situations, so that
I only appeared to cooperate. The purpose of this paper was to consider 
punishment from the perspective of the punished person -- a perspective thus 
far absent from the literature.

 'Rational' Responses to Punishment

Shinada and Yamagishi (2007) assumed that the rational response to punishment 
would be to cooperate with one's punisher. The word 'rational', however, means 
to reason sensibly and to reject what is unreasonable. According to Heidegger 
(1962), the most basic human motivation is 'care' about one's future 
as-yet-unlived existence. One's care for one's future is expressed in the twin 
needs for 'self-magnification' and 'self-justification' (Nicholson, 2009). 
Punishment deflates one's sense of self-magnification, and questions whether 
one's actions were unjustified. It would not be unreasonable to resist 
punishment that threatened one's most basic needs. When I applied for promotion
I sought self-magnification. Promotion to full professor would erase a 
disadvantage in comparison between myself and my higher ranked colleagues. 
Higher ranks are taken more seriously and treated with greater respect. Being 
promoted would justify the my work and professional life. It would be rational 
to believe my punishers were wrong, as an act of self-justification (Nicholson,
2009).

A year has passed. I still feel angry because I still feel that I was unfairly 
treated. I know this feeling of rancor is dangerous if my Dean senses it so I 
do my best to appear cooperative. Other times I feel despairing -- like my work
isn't worth doing -- though I do my best to appear reasonably happy and 
accepting. If rancor is the channeling of one's anger outward against one's 
evaluators, despair is directing it against oneself for failing. I know that 
feelings of rancor or despair are psychological paths of resistance to my 
punishment. At the same time, I know there is a third path. I could simply 
confess my mistakes to myself, genuinely try to repent and change, seeking 
rehabilitation and promotion by trying to be a good citizen.

 Rancor and the Road to Ressentiment

Scheler (1961) described the process by which feelings of rancor and desire for
revenge become ressentiment. Ressentiment is the reversal of a person's values. 
An altruistic person becomes, for example, entirely self-interested and ceases 
to value altruism. Ressentiment starts when a person feels attacked or injured 
but is helpless to retaliate. S/he feels rancor but 'can only indulge in 
imaginary revenge' (Scheler, 1961, 44). I angrily defended my application for 
promotion when it was threatened with rejection. When I was ignored, I realized
I was helpless.

Desire for revenge becomes rancor, which becomes envy, then an impulse to 
detract, spite, and finally ressentiment. It is dangerous for a subordinate to 
harbor such feelings for his/ her superior. They could lead to further 
punishment if found out. Scheler argued that as a result the rancor and desire 
for revenge were repressed into the punished person's unconscious. In Jungian 
terms (Jung, 1979), the feelings of revenge and rancor originate in the Ego -- 
responsible for one's feelings of identity. Ego fears the rancor will be 
visible in the Persona -- the mask worn by Ego in response to the demands of 
social convention. In self-defense, Ego denies the feelings and represses them 
into the unconscious where they become part of the Shadow -- the portion of the
personality that contains unpleasant and socially reprehensible thoughts and 
feelings it would be dangerous to express. Ego believes it has expunged the 
rancor, but the Shadow is a highly energized unconscious process that 'will try
to break through the repression, and if it succeeds, the person will behave in 
an irrational and impulsive fashion' (Hall & Lindzey, 1965, 100). Quenk (2002) 
observed that the Shadow is especially likely to break into consciousness under
stressful circumstances. I could consciously believe I was cooperating in 
response to my punishment, yet unconsciously awaiting a chance for revenge.

After my Dean denied my promotion, he behaved very solicitously asking if I was
OK and offering to help me develop a plan to achieve future promotion. I 
carefully insisted I was fine. As long as I appeared to 'rationally' accept my 
situation I felt it would improve my future chances. Yet as department chair, I
sit on my Dean's planning committee. I am partly responsible for helping achieve
his/ her strategic plan but have come to believe it flawed. In the stress of 
confronting this plan in committee, I have become Cicero to my Dean's Caesar. I
wonder whether I criticize his plan because it is truly flawed, or whether I see
it as flawed because I want him to fail. As I publicly support the plan as Chair,
I wonder if I will find ways to impede it. The paradox of ressentiment is 
that consciously I cooperate and support my punisher, while unconsciously 
feeling rancor and desiring revenge. I don't seem to know my own mind, thinking
I am on the road to rehabilitation and then behaving otherwise.

 Despair and the Road to Nowhere

Despair is a reaction against oneself (Kierkegaard, 1989) for failing to 
successfully self-magnify and self-justify. In a nutshell (Marino, 2008), the 
despairing individual gives up on him/ herself, feels that any hope for the 
future has been negated, and believes that it has become impossible for him/ 
her to change to the degree required by the punisher. In its earliest stage 
(Kierkegaard, 1989), despair is characterized by the wish to become a different 
person -- the one who would have been promoted -- but the despairing individual
is unconscious of his/ her despair. The despair is hidden from both the punisher
and the one who despairs. Kierkegaard (1989, 55) observed, 'happiness is 
despair's greatest hiding place.'

Again, there is a paradox. The punisher thinks the punished person has accepted
the punishment, even repented, and remains relatively happy, as I have tried to 
communicate to my Dean. The punished person believes the same, but 
unconsciously s/he has given up hope that self-magnification can be achieved. 
In my darker moments, I wished I was someone else more successful and believed 
that my research was not worth continuing. If I unconsciously despair, I will 
appear rational and cooperative but will no longer be motivated to achieve the 
results demanded by the organization. I will be 'deadwood' -- of no further 
value -- even though my punisher and I believe that I am rehabilitating.

 Confession, Repentance and the Path to Rehabilitation

Scheler (2010) argued that punishment would fail unless a punished person was 
willing to voluntarily and sincerely change his/ her undesirable behavior. Fear
of punishment or further punishment, characteristic of retributive justice, was 
ineffective in producing voluntary change because its goal was to force 
involuntary change. Fear produced mixed motives (Kierkegaard, 1956) that 
adulterated repentance (Scheler, 2010). Am I sincerely confessing my errors and
repenting, or am I manipulatively hoping to receive a reward for appearing 
honest or changed, or hoping to ameliorate the punishment? If I am focused on 
the reward, or the punishment, neither I, nor my punisher can know if I am 
being sincere or manipulative (Kierkegaard, 1956). If I cannot be forced to 
voluntarily and wholeheartedly change, then the punishment process must be 
handled in a more effective way. The punishment must contain the forgiveness of
itself (Abramson & Senyshyn, 2009) -- genuine forgiveness -- so that fear does 
not provoke resistance in the punished person. Scheler (2010) argued resistance
was lessened when the punisher accepted on behalf of the organization some 
collective responsibility for the negative outcome or how to mediate it. In my 
case, perhaps the criteria for promotion could have been made clearer, or 
perhaps my Dean was sincere in his offer to help me devise a joint plan to 
ensure future promotion -- an offer I did not pursue in my rancor and suspicion.

This is not to say that the wrong doer is absolved of personal responsibility. 
Jankelevitch (2005) argued that true forgiveness did not mean one changed one's
mind about whether a wrong doer was really guilty and deserving punishment. It 
meant the relationship with the wrong doer was altered so that the punisher no 
longer held the misdeeds against the wrong doer, nor demanded any additional 
restitution, nor claimed any moral advantage or high ground. True forgiveness 
was the opposite of retributive justice (Jankevevich, 2005). Forgiven, the 
punished person was not pressed to defend (rancor), or denigrate him/ herself 
(despair), and could, perhaps, confess his/ her own responsibility to him/ 
herself for what had happened, and repent. The confession was more likely to be
sincere and result in voluntary behavioral changes if it was made privately to 
oneself and not under the pressure of mixed motives or continuing judgment.

In my own case, my organization must have engineered my punishment more 
effectively than I realized. The punishment remained confidential and I noticed
that my colleagues seemed unaware of it. Perhaps an attempt had been made to 
allow me private reflection time. My self-magnification was maintained by 
renewing me as department chair. I have repented some of what I did regarding 
my research productivity, and the quality of the journals I am aiming at. 
Perhaps the punishment is having the intended effect, but it worries me that 
the rancor and/ or despair could be biding their time in my unconscious.

 In Conclusion

When I read that the effectiveness of punishment is in question because both 
positive and negative effects are reported, I wondered the extent to which the 
positive effects were only apparent. When the punished person's 
self-magnification and self-justification are threatened, feelings of rancor 
and/ or despair are induced. When rancor (Scheler, 1961) and despair 
(Kierkegaard, 1989) are repressed into the unconscious, then the paradox is that
punished person may consciously intend to cooperate and change, while 
unconsciously seeking revenge or simply giving up. To the extent that 
punishment produces only apparent positive effects, it has failed. It is worth 
considering combining punishment with forgiveness to gain repentance rather 
than using punishment as an ineffective instrument of justice. I have been 
given the opportunity to consider and confess my failings to myself and perhaps
I am making progress. Perhaps rancor and despair are stages on the way to 
acceptance, confession and repentance. Punishment is ineffective for those who 
stop either at rancor/ ressentiment or despair. Effective punishment requires a
process that facilitates voluntary repentance and change by the wrong doer.

 References

Abramson, Neil Remington and Senyshyn, Yaroslav (2009). Punishment and 
Forgiveness: A Phenomenological Analysis of Archetypal Leadership Patterns and 
the Implications for Educational Practice. Interchange, 40(4): 373-402.

Arvey, Richard D. and Ivancevich, John M. (1980). Punishment in Organizations: 
A Review, Propositions, and Research Suggestions, Academy of Management Review,
5(1), 123-132.

Ball, Gail A., Trevino, Linda K. and Sims, Henry P. Junior (1994). Just and 
Unjust Punishment: Influences on Subordinate Performance and Citizenship, 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(2), 299-322.

Butterfield, Kenneth D., Trevino, Linda Klebe and Ball, Gail A. (1996). 
Punishment from the Manager's Perspective: A Grounded Investigation and 
Inductive Model, Academy of Management Journal, 39(6), 1479-1512.

Hall, Calvin S. and Lindzey, Calvin (1965). Theories of Personality. New York: 
John Wiley.

Heidegger, Martin (1962). Being and Time. New York: HarperSanFrancisco.

Jankelevitch, Vladimir (2005). Forgiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Janssen, Marco A. and Bushman, Clint (2008). Evolution of Cooperation and 
Altruistic Punishment when Retaliation is Possible, Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 254, 541-545.

Jung, C.G. (1979). Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self. 
Princeton: Princeton University.

Kierkegaard, Soren (1989). The Sickness Unto Death. London: Penguin.

Kierkegaard, Soren (1956). Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing. New York: 
Harper.

Marino, Gordon (2008). Despair and Depression. In Edward F. Mooney (Ed.), 
Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard. Bloomington: Indiana University, 121-
128.

Nicholson, Graeme (2009). Justifying Our Existence: An Essay in Applied 
Phenomenology. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Podsakoff, P.M. (1982). Determinants of a Supervisor's Use of Rewards and 
Punishments: A Literature Review and Suggestions for Future Research, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 29, 58-83.

Quenk, Naomi L. (2002). Was That Really Me? How Everyday Stress Brings Out Our 
Hidden Personality. London: Davies-Black.

Scheler, Max (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. 
Evanston: Northwestern University.

Scheler, Max (1961). Ressentiment. New York: Free Press.

Shinada, Mizuho and Yamagishi, Toshio (2007). Punishing Free Riders: Direct and
Indirect Promotion of Cooperation, Evolution and Human Behavior, 28: 330-339.

Williams, Steve (1998). A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Organizational Punishment and Employee Performance/ Satisfaction, Research and 
Practice in Human Resource Management, 6(1), 51-64.

(c) Neil Abramson 2010

E-mail: nabramso@sfu.ca

Neil Remington Abramson
Simon Fraser University
Segal Graduate School of Business
500 Hastings Street
Vancouver BC
Canada

-=-

II. 'ANSWER ON THE ETHICS OF MONETARY INTEREST' BY GEOFFREY KLEMPNER

On Tues, Feb 16, 2010 at 23:20:53
Douglas asked this question:

What do you think of the role of collecting monetary interest, on a societal 
level, in Western culture? Is collecting interest positive? Is collecting 
interest moral? Sixty per cent of Americans are in debt. It is pertinent. 
Credit cards are the main culprit, given the high interest rates that credit 
card companies operate.

I want to take a fresh look at a very old debate. Long before Marx wrote about 
the evils of capitalism and money, lending money for profit was seen as 
something inherently evil. Christ drove the money lenders out from the temple. 
It is written in the Quran that those who practice usury are 'controlled by the
devil'. Does that mean that Christ was against money lending, or only when it 
was conducted within the holy confines of temple? Is all taking of interest
'usury', or only when the interest charged is excessive?

Suppose we turned Douglas' question on its head: 'What do you think of the role
of making interest on savings on a societal level, in Western culture? Is making
interest on savings moral?'

Why should I save my hard earned money rather than spend it all? One answer 
would be that I need cash for a rainy day. But that isn't a very reliable 
incentive. If the rainy day never comes, then I get no benefit at all, no 
reward for my financial prudence.

Here's an alternative: I join a savings co-operative, where members agree to 
pay in a certain amount each month. Members of the co-operative who want to buy
a house can apply to the co-operative for a loan at reasonable interest rates. 
The profit from the interest rates finances a modest rate of interest for the 
regular savers. That, in a nutshell, is how many of the well known 'building 
societies' or 'friendly societies' were formed: today's mortgage companies.

Or let's say I have a friend who is a trained chef and wants to open a 
restaurant. I offer to loan my friend a sum of money to be paid back over five 
years, plus an amount of interest based on profits. If the restaurant venture 
fails to make a profit, then all I get back is my original stake. If it goes 
bust then we both lose. However, I have great confidence in my friend's 
business sense as well as in his culinary abilities, and I fully expect to 
receive back more than I originally gave.

Examples like these would be considered wholly free from ethical opprobrium. 
However, I would go further and emphasize their praiseworthy aspects. The 
impulse to help someone out is an altruistic impulse, even if at the very same 
time doing so is in one's own interest. There is no contradiction in this. The 
feeling of being part of a larger whole, making one's contribution to a 
collective effort is rewarding in itself, leaving aside any financial 
advantages. It is a genuine case of altruism, but without the element of 
self-sacrifice.

Along with this sense of fellow-feeling necessarily comes an element of trust. 
To put a fixed amount into the co-operative fund, month after month, year after
year, or to finance my friend's ambition to be a restauranteur, requires an act 
of faith. It isn't blind faith. I know these people. They know me. Things have 
come to a pretty pass if there's no-one you can trust and everyone you meet is 
out for number one.

Of course, Douglas will say that he wasn't thinking of these cases. He is 
concerned with the bad examples of monetary interest. But that changes the 
discussion rather dramatically. We aren't concerned with whether making an 
interest is morally right or wrong per se but rather with the particular 
circumstances in which it is wrong.

Another factor comes into play here. My two examples would be considered to lie
on the fringes of capitalist economics -- if they belong to economics at all. 
Once we take into consideration the impersonal phenomenon of the market place, 
faith, trust and altruism play a relatively smaller, although I would argue 
still not insignificant role. In place of the mutual desire to reach a fair 
agreement for the sake of friendship, there is free competition between 
potential lenders. Other things being equal, you go for the best deal.

But if this were really true, how is it that credit card companies are able to 
charge so much for loans? How is it (if it is true) that sixty per cent of 
Americans are in debt? I wonder if these two facts could be connected.

It has become almost a knee-jerk reaction to blame corporations and big 
business for all manner of financial woes. There have been so many appalling 
stories in the news, that you can pick targets at will. The case of the 
sub-prime mortgage market is merely the latest in a long history of scandals --
if that's what interests you.

In my role as business ethicist I am of course professionally interested in 
what it is to practice good business. But that's not what we are talking about 
here. Douglas raised the question of credit cards and debt. For once, I think 
the ethical spotlight needs to be trained on consumers rather than on the 
financial institutions who service their needs.

What do you call someone who borrows from a friend, knowing that you can't 
repay the loan? Assuming that your friend does not know this. Isn't it the 
worst case of using someone else for your own ends? Yet when you apply to have 
the limit raised on your credit card account far beyond what you know you can 
afford, that's just a fair gamble. If you go bankrupt and can't pay your debt, 
there is no victim apart from yourself. The credit card company takes a 
minuscule hit on its profits.

I would like to see borrowing more than you can afford to be seen for what it 
is: a form of potential theft. You wouldn't do it to a friend. Then why do you 
think it's OK to do it with American Express?

In a free market, you would expect that prices rise with higher demand. Credit 
card companies charge the interest that they do because you are prepared to pay.
We are not talking about back street loan sharks who take advantage of 
people's misfortune to charge an arm and a leg for a small loan. My average 
weekly collection of junk mail usually contains several unsolicited offers from
credit card companies touting 'zero interest on balance transfers' and the
'lowest APR'.

I talked rather emotively of 'theft' but I think it is closer to the truth to 
say that over time the idea that being in debt is a bad thing has eroded to the
point where we see the difference between having savings and being in debt as of
little significance. If a rainy day comes, it is just as likely that the modest 
sum of money you've saved won't be enough anyway. But you can always borrow.

Look on the bright side. If money is evil, or the root of all evil as 
traditional religion preached, then surely it is a good thing that we care less
about money than we used to do. Isn't it?

Ask a Philosopher
http://www.philosophypathways.com/questions/index.html

Tentative Answers
http://tentativeanswers.blogspot.com

(c) Geoffrey Klempner 2010

E- mail: klempner@fastmail.net

-=-

III. CALL FOR PAPERS: AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY OF MANAGEMENT

 Philosophy of Management journal Special Issue

Guest Editors:

David W. Lutz (Catholic University of Eastern Africa)
Peter John Opio (University of East London)

 Rationale

In the half-century since African nations gained political independence, a rich
body of African philosophy has been produced. While there is much diversity 
within this body of literature, there is also a consensus that traditional 
African cultures differ in significant respects from modern Western cultures. 
Nevertheless, the management theories offered to African managers and students 
of management in African business schools and the core texts are predominantly 
Western. One obstacle to practising African management in a manner that is both
productive and consistent with African cultural traditions is the mismatch 
between African cultures and management theories that are taught and prescribed
in Africa, but that were developed within and for quite different cultures. 
Research in African philosophy of management can make a significant 
contribution to the existing literature in African philosophy and management, 
as well as to the practice of African management.

Although a substantial body of African business ethics literature already 
exists, it is, like management theories, based largely on Western ontology. The
impact of these ethical theories on the practice of management in Africa is 
negligible. Most business ethics literature either takes management theory for 
granted and concerns itself with the moral dilemmas of managing according to 
existing theories, or argues that some management theory is unethical. There is,
in any case, a significant difference between business ethics and philosophy 
of management  just as there is a difference between medical ethics and 
philosophy of medicine, or between legal ethics and jurisprudence. Philosophy 
of management is concerned with the foundational principles underlying the 
theory and practice of management, rooted in a specific world-view. A practice 
of management relevant to the African situation requires re-examining the 
relationship between philosophy and management within African cultures.

The practice of business management in Africa involves not only management in 
indigenous African firms, but also management, by both Africans and 
non-Africans, within African subsidiaries of multinational corporations 
headquartered outside Africa. Furthermore, there are significant differences 
between Anglo-Saxon, Continental-European and Asian multinational corporations.
While the contrast between Anglo-Saxon individualism and African communalism is 
stark, the differences between African and Continental-European, or between 
African and Asian cultures are more subtle. There are, consequently, 
opportunities for research in the philosophy of managing within African 
subsidiaries of non-African corporations.

 Scope

This special issue aims to assemble papers that explore the relationships 
between African philosophy and management and the implications thereof for the 
practice of management in Africa.

While the primary focus will be on the philosophy of sub-Saharan Africa, papers
about North Africa will be welcomed, as long as they address the theme.

Philosophy of management includes the management of both commercial and 
non-commercial organisations.

Philosophy of management includes not only the relationship between management 
and moral philosophy, but also the relationship between management and other 
branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, etc.

Although we encourage the integration of empirical findings and reflections on 
the praxis of African management into the papers, they should be primarily 
philosophical/ reflective in nature. Papers that merely describe African 
managerial practices, without conceptual depth and philosophical analysis, will
not be considered for publication.

Papers are called for offering fresh philosophical treatment of African 
philosophy of management in areas such as the following:

  - The ontology of the African firm
  
  - The contemporary relevance of African traditional cultures
     to the practice of management in Africa
  
  - The relationship between African traditional cultures and
     organisational culture
  
  - Mismatches between Anglo-American management theory
     and African cultures
  
  - The philosophy of management within African subsidiaries
     of non-African corporations
  
  - The philosophy of managing African governmental, educational
     or other non-profit institutions
  
  - African philosophy and human resource practices, leadership,
     marketing, finance, or some other particular aspect of
     management
  
The above list is purely illustrative.

 Contributions

Contributors are asked to send paper proposals with abstracts. In case the 
proposal is provisionally accepted, the contributor will be asked to submit a 
full paper draft for peer-review.

Proposed contributions will be welcome in the form of:

Papers (3,000-7,000 words)
Book Reviews (750-1,500 words)

Proposals for literature reviews will also be considered.

 Timetable

Proposals with abstracts:   Due by Friday 12 February 2010
Provisional acceptances:   Notified by Friday 19 February 2010
Drafts for refereeing:   Due by Friday 21 May 2010
Referee reports:   Friday 20 August 2010
Final drafts:   Due by Friday 8 October 2010
Publication:   Spring 2011

Please send proposals, abstracts, papers and any enquiries to:

Dr. David W. Lutz
Email: david_w_lutz@yahoo.com
Phone: +254 722 467040

Submissions should be sent by email attachment (Word or RTF format). Please 
provide a separate brief resume of the author(s) and full address for 
correspondence, including phone, fax and email.

Full author guidelines for paper layout and referencing are at:

http://www.managementphilosophers.com/Getting%20Published.htm

Guest Editors: Dr. David W. Lutz (Catholic University of Eastern Africa) and Dr.
Peter John Opio (University of East London)

DAVID W. LUTZ received his MBA and Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of 
Notre Dame. He is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Management at the Catholic 
University of Eastern Africa (Nairobi), where he also founded the University's 
MBA Programme. He co-edited, with Paul Mimbi, Shareholder Value and the Common 
Good and translated Peter Koslowskis Prinzipien der Ethischen Okonomie/ 
Principles of Ethical Economy into English. He has published articles in moral 
theory, military ethics, bioethics and business ethics, and has worked as a 
management consultant in Estonia.

PETER JOHN OPIO is Senior Lecturer in Strategy and International Business and 
Programme Head, M.Sc. Programme in International Business Management at the 
University of East London. Previously he was Dean of Business at Uganda Martyrs
University and Deputy Vice Chancellor for Academics at Kampala International 
University (Uganda). He received his MBA from the University of Hull and his 
Ph.D. in philosophy from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. He has published 
several articles on business and development ethics, corporate governance and 
strategy.

 Philosophy of Management

Founded in 2001, Philosophy of Management is the established forum for 
philosophically informed thinking about management in theory and practice. It 
seeks to define and develop the field of philosophy of management. The Journal 
is read by thinkers, scholars, teachers, consultants and practitioners in 20 
countries. It is for philosophers working in all traditions, for management 
thinkers concerned with the philosophical foundations and validity of their 
subject and practising managers seeking to engage with the philosophical issues
raised by what they believe and do. Contributors have included some of the 
worlds leading philosophers, management scholars, consultants and managers. It 
is independent, international, refereed and appears three times each year.

Full details at http://www.managementphilosophers.com

PLEASE FORWARD THIS TO ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE INTERESTED. THANK YOU.

Nigel Laurie
Editor and Publisher
Philosophy of Management
PO Box 217
Oxted
Surrey RH8 8AJ
UK

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